Evaluation of safety-oriented two-version architectures by Carrasco, Juan A. et al.
Evaluation of Safety-Oriented Two-Version Architectures
Juan A. Carrasco and Joan Figueras
Departament d’Enginyeria Electro`nica
Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
Diagonal 647, plta. 9
08028 Barcelona, Spain
Annie Kuntzmann
CISI Ingenierie
France
Except for formatting details, this version matches exactly the version published with the
same title and author in Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 14, no. 3, 1991, pp.
155–162
Abstract
A Markov model taking into account physical and design faults for a two-version architec-
ture oriented to safety-related applications is developed. Only a probabilistic knowledge of the
initial state of the versions in relation to the presence of design faults is assumed. The model can
be split into two submodels accounting separately for physical and design faults, and a closed
form expression for the unsafety of the system is obtained. The parameter estimation problem
is discussed and a method to predict the probability distribution of the number of related design
faults at the beginning of the operational life of the system is proposed. The method uses a
pool model to process fault-occurrence data collected during a “face-to-face” debugging of the
two versions. It has by nature a limited capability for proving version diversity, but it is shown
that the limit is of the order of the diversity reported by recent experiments on real software.
Finally, the impact of version correction during operation is shown to be negligible for critical
applications.
1 Introduction
One of the most critical problems faced in the production of fault-tolerant systems is how to monitor
architecture design together with the development process in order to meet the dependability and
performance specifications ensuring cost effectiveness. Evaluation methods encompassing physical
(hardware) faults and design faults introduced during the specification and development processes
might help solve this problem. The need for such a combined evaluation has recently been pointed
out [10]. In critical applications, the complexity of current software and hardware designs makes
it no longer possible to cope with design faults using only a fault-avoidance approach, and fault-
tolerance techniques should be considered. Design diversity [1] is a suggested approach to provide
design fault-tolerance.
Design diversity is applied differently in safety-oriented and reliability-oriented applications.
Safety-oriented applications do not require complete fault-tolerance but merely error detection. For
applications of this type, design diversity is implemented using two versions and a comparison mon-
itor, which takes the system to a safe failure state when the outputs of the two versions differ. For
reliability-oriented applications, design faults have to be tolerated. In applications of this type, three
or more versions are used in conjuction with a majority voter to decide which of the results provided
by the versions are to be issued. The efficiency of design diversity depends critically on the extent
to which the versions fail independently. Experimental results recently carried out on multiversion
software seem to indicate that even though the versions do not fail independently [7], multiversion
systems improve significantly single-version systems in both safety and reliability-oriented applica-
tions [8]. In our opinion, since hardware design is similar in many aspects to software development,
a parallel promise stands in relation to hardware design faults.
Some work has been done toward the combined modeling of physical and design faults [3, 10,
12], but, to the best of our knowledge, no evaluation of multiversion systems incorporating both
types of faults has been carried out. In this paper, a Markov model to evaluate the unsafety of a two-
version system with version correction during operation is developed and solved. This architecture
can match the requirements of most safety-oriented applications at a reasonable development cost.
2 Taxonomy
2.1 Architecture
Figure 1 shows the architecture under evaluation. Two independently designed computation chan-
nels in synchronous operation share a given set of inputs and produce separate outputs that are
compared by a totally self-checking (TSC) comparison monitor. The output of the system is taken
from the first channel and is considered valid as long as no failure indication is given by the moni-
tor. The comparison monitor can be implemented using well-known techniques [9]. We would like
to point out that no assumption is made regarding the particular implementation of the channels.
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Figure 1: Architecture of a two-version system.
They could be special-purpose VLSI systems or programmed systems. The only requirement is that
correct outputs from both channels should be equal.
2.2 Fault Model
The faults considered for the development of the model can be classified as follows:
* physical faults
− in channels
+ unrelated
+ related
− in the monitor
+ benign
+ latent
* design faults (in channels)
+ unrelated
+ related
Physical faults are permanent or temporary malfunctions of the hardware resulting from phys-
ical degradation processes or external disturbances. They can affect the channels or the monitor.
Physical faults affecting only one channel are called unrelated faults; physical faults affecting both
channels are called related faults. Related physical faults produce erroneous, but usually not identi-
cal, outputs in both channels. Physical monitor faults are classified into benign and latent. Benign
faults are within the self-checking capability of the monitor and produce a FAILURE indication. La-
tent faults fall outside the self-checking capability of the monitor and do not produce that indication.
It is assumed that the comparison monitor is design fault-free. Design faults are viewed as
regions in the system input space, which in general would consist of sequence of input vectors.
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Figure 2: Conceptual behavioral model.
When the input enters the region associated with a design fault, the fault is activated and an error
occurs. In our model, regions in different versions are either disjoint (unrelated design faults) or
coincident (related design faults). Related design faults may or may not produce identical errors.
2.3 Behavioral model
The behavioral model is obtained by combining the fault model with the maintenance strategy and
is shown in Figure 2. An unsafe failure occurs if an erroneous output is given without a FAIL-
URE indication. This happens if a related physical or design fault produces identical errors in both
channels, or if the first channel gives an erroneous output in the presence of a latent fault in the
comparison monitor preventing the recognition of the disagreement. When a FAILURE indication
is issued, the operation of the system is stopped for diagnosis. If a permanent physical fault or a
design fault is found, a maintenance operation starts. Otherwise, a transient fault is assumed and the
system is immediately restarted. From a purely statistical point of view, it would seem reasonable to
restart the system’s operation when a design fault is diagnosed and perform the correction off-line:
the system is, after all, as good as it was before. However, from a psychological point of view, this
does not seem reasonable, even if the design fault is belived to be confined to only one channel.
From the user’s point of view, the system alternates between the UP and SAFE DOWN states
until the undesired unsafe failure occurs. In order to quantify the dependability of the system, we
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will use the unsafety US (t), defined as the probability of having an unsafe failure over the first t
time units of operation in the UP state, i.e., ignoring the time spent in the SAFE DOWN state. This
choice is motivated by the following reasons:
1) it is a reasonable one in the context of our measure,
2) it gives an upper bound for the unsafety computed over the real time,
3) the bound is tight in the frequent case in which the maintenance and correction rates are much
higher than the failure rates,
4) it simplifies the model significantly.
A stochastic model for the evaluation of the unsafety of the system is developed in the next
section.
3 The Evaluation Model
3.1 Model Hypotheses
The actual faulty behavior of the comparison monitor in coordination with the channels is complex.
First, the self-checking attribute of the comparison monitor only implies that benign faults are de-
tected (cause a FAILURE indication) for some pairs of channel outputs. Hence, in fact, benign faults
are “latent” for some time. In addition, a latent fault in the comparison monitor can result in a FAIL-
URE indication for some agreeing pair of channel outputs or in the absence for some disagreeing
pair. A detailed model would be dependent on the actual design of the comparison monitor and on
the actual operation of the channels since the production of the fault, and would be in general very
difficult, if not impossible, to build. A simpler model will be used in this paper. The latency of
bening faults will be neglected and it will be assumed, pessimistically, that an unsafe failure follows
immediately after a latent fault. Under these hypotheses and bearing in mind that the unsafety has
been defined over the “up” time, only the faults leading to an unsafe failure need be considered.
Having defined the unsafety over the “up” time, only the repair processes modifying the pro-
duction of faults leading to an unsafe failure (critical faults) need be modeled. Since physical failure
processes are not modified by repair actions and the system has only one operational mode, critical
physical faults are modeled by a constant rate λCP , which can be obtained by adding the rate of
related physical faults producing identical errors and the rate of monitor latent faults.
Unrelated design faults are always detected and can be ignored in the model. Related design
faults can cause an unsafe failure and have to be considered. An activation/correction model for
related design faults is needed. The one proposed is a generalization of the Goel and Okumoto
model [4], and is described by the following hypotheses:
1) initially there are k related design faults with probability qk, k ≥ 1,
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2) the total related design fault activation rate when k ≥ 1 faults are present is ψk,
3) a related design fault, when activated, causes identical errors with probability c (error correla-
tion),
4) an activated related desing fault causing a disagreement is diagnosed as such with probability
Ed (diagnosis efficiency) and with probability 1− Ed is treated as a transient physical fault1,
i.e., the system is restarted without correction,
5) a diagnosed related design fault is properly corrected in a version with probability Ec (correc-
tion efficiency),
6) a related design fault not properly corrected in any version leaves the same related design fault
activation rate as the system had before.
Thus, with probability c the activation of a related design fault causes an unsafe failure, with
probability
α = (1− c)Ed
[
1− (1− Ec)
2
] (1)
the fault is removed from the system, and with probability 1 − c − α either the fault is not well
diagnosed and therefore not removed, or is improperly corrected in both versions, in both cases
leaving the system with the same related design fault activation rate as it had before.
3.2 Model Solution
Assume now that the number of initial related faults k is bounded by n (we will show later how to
choose a suitable value for n). Then, it is possible to describe the evolution of the system on the up
states until its first unsafe failure by the homogeneous, continuous-time Markov chain depicted in
Figure 3a. Considering that all the up states have a common transition with rate λCP to the unsafe
state, it is possible to decompose the model in two submodels: one accounting for critical physical
faults (Figure 3b) and a second one accounting for related design faults (Figure 3c). The safety S(t)
can be expressed as
S(t) = Sp(t)Sd(t)
where Sp(t) (physical safety) and Sd(t) (design safety) are obtained using the submodels. When
dealing with safety-related applications it is often more significant the unsafety US (t) = 1 − S(t)
or probability of having an unsafe failure over the first t time units. US(t) can be computed from
USp(t) and US d(t) using
US (t) = USp(t) + USd(t)− US p(t)US d(t)
1Note that the model neglects the probability of diagnosing a design fault for only one version, which is estimated to
be a very unlikely event, considering that related desing faults have a common cause.
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Figure 3: Unsafety evaluation model (a) and its decomposition into a physical unsafety evaluation
model (b) and a design unsafety evaluation model (c).
The model decomposition is interesting because it makes it possible to analyze separately the
contributions of the two types of faults to the overall unsafety. The unsafety due to critical physical
faults is given by
US p(t) = 1− e
−λCP t
The evaluation of USd(t) requires the transient solution of the Markov chain depicted in Fig-
ure 3c. Let qi be the probability that the initial number of related faults is i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Under the
assumption ψi 6= ψj for i 6= j, which is true for the model, the following closed-form solution (see
Appendix) can be obtained.
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qiAi −
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
i=k
qiB
i
k
)
e−ρkt (2)
where
ρk = (c+ α)ψk (3)
Ai = 1−
(
α
c+ α
)i
(4)
Bik =
c
ρk
k∑
l=1
(
α
c+ α
)i−l
i∏
m=l
ψm
i∏
m=l
m6=k
(ψm − ψk)
. (5)
Two particular cases are worth mentioning: a) total error correlation (c = 1), and b) no version
correction. The latter can be obtained from the general model by making Ed = 0. In both cases
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α = 0 (1) and the model of Figure 3c is reduced to a Markov chain having only transitions from the
states i = 1, . . . , n to the unsafe state, with rates ψi for case a and cψi for case b. These models are
easily solved yielding
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qi
(
1− e−ψit
)
for case a (6)
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qi
(
1− e−cψit
)
for case b (7)
Let us consider the problem of selecting a truncation value n for the initial number of related
design faults. The limit design unsafety is given by (2)
USd(∞) =
n∑
i=1
qiAi (8)
where Ai = 1 for the particular cases. A suitable criterion is to take n so that the relative truncation
error in USd(∞) is lower than a specified tolerance TOL. According to (4), Ai ≤ 1. Then, it
suffices to take the smallest n with
1−
n∑
i=0
qi
n∑
i=0
qiAi
< TOL ,
since the numerator is an upper bound of the absolute truncation error and the denominator is a lower
bound of the absolute value.
4 Model Parameter Estimation
The critical physical fault rate λCP can be evaluated by architectural and circuit analysis, fault
injection, etc., and will not be discussed here. As it will be shown in the next section, the other
most influencial parameters are c, qk, and ψk. When the system has only one output signal, it can
be ensured that c = 1. Otherwise, c is likely to be smaller. In general, the higher the design level to
which the fault belongs, the more likely it is that the errors resulting from related design faults will
be correlated. Analysis of the modular structure of the two versions and correlation with statistical
data could be used to estimate c. Of course, it is also possible to take the pessimistic assumption that
c = 1. In this case, the simpler model (6) can be used.
Perhaps the most difficult problem is the estimation of the distribution of the number of remain-
ing related faults when the operation of the system starts. A suggestive approach is to use an under-
lying model for the production of design faults accounting for related faults. Such a model should
include parameters characterizing: a) the complexity of the design, b) the specification methods, c)
the level of diversity of the development methods and tools, and d) the mastery of the designers and
tools. However, we consider it doubtful that such an approach will be workable because of
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1) the difficulty in indentifying a reduced set of significant parameters,
2) the limited amount of data on related design faults,
3) the rapid evolution of design methods and tools.
Our approach is a generalization of the methods currently used in “software science” to monitor
the reliability growth during debugging and estimate the software reliability at the release point. Our
suggestion is as follows.
Once both versions have been cleaned out of coarse flaws, they are debugged in parallel using
the same test inputs (“face-to-face” debugging). Errors are monitored and design faults corrected.
At a given point, both versions are considered good enough to be released for operation. Let D1 and
D2 be the number of observed (and corrected) unrelated design faults in, respectively, each version,
and Dr the number of observed (and corrected) related design faults. “Software science” (see, for
instance, [11]) can be used to estimate the number of unrelated design faults in each version before
the “face-to-face” debugging started. Let N1 and N2 be the number of those faults, Nu = N1 +N2
and Du = D1 +D2. Now, we can think in the debugging process as a sample without replacement
from a “pool” containing two types of objects:
1) Nu unrelated design faults,
2) Nr related design faults,
and our problem is the estimation of Nr − Dr, or equivalently Nr, knowing the outcome of the
sample (Du and Dt) and Nu.
The only assumption of the model is that all faults are extracted from the “pool” with the same
probability. This is equivalent to assume that for the debugging input sequence all design faults
are activated at the same rate. Using this “pool” model it is possible to evaluate “a posteriori”
probabilities q′k and from them the “a priori” probabilities qk of having k = Nr −Dr related design
faults after the sample. This yields
qk =
q′k
∞∑
l=0
q′l
(9)
where the “a posteriori” probabilities can be computed by
q′l =
(
Nu
Du
)(
Dr + l
Dr
)
(
Nu +Dr + l
Du +Dr
) (10)
A potential drawback of the method is that the amount of fault data collected during the “face-
to-face” debugging establishes a bound on the provable diversity. The bound for given Nu and Du is
obtained for Dr = 0 and is illustrated in Figure 4, where the predicted average number of remaining
related design faults ANF is plotted against the number of undetected unrelated design faults for
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Figure 4: Average number of related faults predicted at the beginning of the operation of the system
when no faults of this class are observed during debugging.
several values of Nu. The results clearly show the convenience of carrying out an extensive “face-
to-face” debugging to minimize the number of undetected unrelated design faults Nu − Du and
starting it as soon as possible, to maximize Nu. The former is limited by economical factors, the
latter by the fact that coarse faults may obey different statistics.
Experimental results for two-version software [8] have given an average probability of error
detection in a two-version system of 0.9968. This is within the bound imposed by the method pro-
posed if a number of unrelated faults for complex software (the applicatiosn of interest) is observed
during the “face-to-face” debugging. For instance, if the number of unrelated faults detected in each
version is 49, and the system is released when it is estiamted that one unrelated design fault remains
in each version, the estimate for the average number of related design faults when the versions are
released can be as good as 0.03 if Dr = 0 (see Fig. 4 with Nu = 100). Then, if we assume c = 0.2
and that all the design faults are activated during operation at the same rate ψ, the total activation rate
of design faults will be approximately 2ψ, whereas coincident errors will be produced only with rate
(0.2)(0.03)ψ. This gives a provable error detection probability bound of 0.9974, which is slightly
large than that observed empirically.
In order to estimate ψk, it can be assumed that all design faults have the same activation rate,
irrespective of whether they are related or not. This assumption si also used in software growth
models for single-version systems [6]. Then, ψ = kψ. The activation rate per design fault could be
estimated from the rates observed during debugging. Usually, special-case inputs rather than random
inputs would be used in order to accelerate the debugging. In this case, an appropriate correction
factor, which could be estimated by correlating the observed failure rates with those obtained with
random inputs, should be used.
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Figure 5: Influence of error correlation and distribution of initial number of related design faults in
the design unsafety with and without version correction during operation.
5 Model Analysis
In this section a qualitative analysis of the unsafety of two-version systems using the model devel-
oped in Section 3 will be carried out. Since the behavior of US p(t) is trivial, only US d(t) will be
considered.
Figure 5 illustrates the influence of the error correlation factor and the initial distribution of
related design faults on the design unsafety. Two cases are considered: operation with version
correction and operation without version correction. The initial distribution of related design faults
is computed using the method proposed in the previous section using two sets of values for Nu,
Du, and Dr, differing only in the value of Dr. The design unsafety is evaluated using (1)–(5) for
the case with version correction, and (7) for the case without version correction, with ψk = kψ. It
can be seen that both c and the initial number of related design faults have an important impact on
the design unsafety. In addition, and at first sight suprisingly, the initial behavior is independent of
whether related design faults are corrected. This is due to the fact that fault correction necessarily
follows fault ocurrence and the initial behavior of USd(t) is mainly determined by the activation
of the first fault. The conclusion is that for critical applications, where a very low probability of
unsafe failure has to be guaranteed, version correction during operation does not help, at least from
a statistical point of view.
The impact of the diagnosis and correction efficiency is thus limited to the asymptotic behavior
of the design unsafety ans is analyzed in Figure 6. It can be seen that diagnosis efficiency is more
important than correction efficiency, and that moderate values for both are enough.
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Figure 6: Impact of diagnosis and correction efficiencies on the asymtotic behavior of the design
unsafety.
6 Conclusions
Starting from a behavioral model, an evaluation model for a two-version architecture for safety-
oriented applications has been developed. The model is sufficiently simple for a closed form expres-
sion for the unsafety to be obtained. The problem of parameter estimation has been studied and a
method for the prediction of the distribution of the number of related design faults at the beginning
of the operation of the system has been proposed. The method has the advantage of not requiring an
underlying model for the production of design faults during the specification and design processes.
It has been shown that, if the face-to-face” debugging is carried out from an early stage, the method
is capable of predicting diversities of the order of magnitude reported in recent experiments for two-
version systems. For a higher number of versions the estimate might be coarse if the versions are
very diverse.
By analyzing the model it has been shown that version correction during operation has a neg-
ligible influence during the period of interest for critical applications. This has two consequences.
First, from a practical point of view, it stresses the need for extensive debugging before operation,
even if different versions are used. Second, from a modeling point of view, only the initial related
design fault rate is significant and correction need not be modeled. It must be emphasized that
these conclusions apply onlt to two-version architectures and critical applications, where a very low
unsafety has to be guaranteed.
Currently we are considering the application of a similar methodology for the modeling of
three-version systems for reliability-oriented applications. Much more complex Markov models are
needed for these systems. A software tool, METFAC [2], is being used to define and process the
models.
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A Derivation of the closed-form expression for US d(t)
USd(t) is the probability of being in the unsafe failure state at time t. Since the state is absorbing
and cannot be reached from the state 0 (see Figure 3c),
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qipi,UF (t) (11)
where pij(t) are the interval transition probabilities of the continuous-time Markov chain (pij(t) is
the probability that the chain is in state j at time t given that it was in state i at the initial time).
Let
ρk = (c+ α)ψk . (12)
The transition probabilities are governed by the set of differential equations (see, for instance [5])
dpii
dt
= −ρipii(t)
dpij
dt
= −ρjpij(t) + αψj+1pi,j+1(t) , 1 ≤ j < i
dpi,UF
dt
=
i∑
j=1
cψjpij(t)
with initial conditions
pii(0) = 1
pij(0) = 0 , 1 ≤ j < i
pi,UF (0) = 0 .
Using the Laplace transform the following linear system is obtained:
sPii(s)− 1 = −ρiPii(s)
sPij(s) = −ρjPij(s) + αψj+1Pi,j+1(s) , 1 ≤ j < i
sPi,UF (s) =
i∑
j=1
cψjPij(s) . (13)
The system can easily be solved iteratively in Pij(s), resulting
Pij(s) =
αi−j
i∏
k=j+1
ψk
i∏
k=j
(s+ ρk)
, 1 ≤ j ≤ i .
13
By substituing in (13), the following expression is obtained:
Pi,UF (s) =
i∑
j=1
cψjα
i−j
i∏
k=j+1
ψk
s
i∏
k=j
(s+ ρk)
.
After fractional expansion, and making use of the fact that ψi 6= ψj for i 6= j, the reverse
Laplace transfrom can be found to be
pi,UF (t) =
i∑
j=1
cψjα
i−j
i∏
k=j+1
ψk
i∏
k=j
ρk
+
i∑
j=1
cψjα
i−j

 ∏
k=j+1
ψk

 i∑
k=j
Cijke
−ρkt
with
Cijk = −
1
ρk
i∏
l=j
l 6=k
(ρl − ρk)
.
After some algebraic manipulations and changes of indices in the summations one obtains
pi,UF (t) = Ai −
i∑
k=1
Bike
−ρkt (14)
with
Ai = 1−
(
α
c+ α
)i
(15)
Bik =
c
ρ : k
k∑
l=1
(
α
c+ α
)i−l
i∏
m=l
ψm
i∏
m=l
m6=k
(ψm − ψk)
. (16)
Finally, by substitution of (14) in (11):
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qiAi −
n∑
i=1
qi
i∑
k=1
Bike
−ρkt
and by rearranging the summations of the second term:
US d(t) =
n∑
i=1
qiAi −
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
i=k
qiB
i
k
)
e−ρkt . (17)
The closed-form solution is defined by (17), (15), (16), and (12).
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